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Abstract	
Over	 the	 past	 decade,	 the	 rapid	 increase	 in	 shale	 gas	 and	 shale	 oil	 production	 in	 the	
United	States	has	profoundly	changed	energy	markets	in	North	America,	and	has	led	to	a	
significant	decrease	in	American	natural	gas	prices.	The	possible	existence	of	large	shale	
deposits	 in	 Europe,	 mainly	 in	 France,	 Poland	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 has	 fostered	
speculation	 on	whether	 the	 "shale	 revolution",	 and	 its	 accompanying	macroeconomic	
impacts,	 could	 be	 duplicated	 in	 Europe.	 However,	 a	 number	 of	 uncertainties,	 notably	
geological,	 technological	 and	 regulatory,	 make	 this	 possibility	 unclear.	 We	 present	 a	
techno‐economic	 model,	 SHERPA	 (SHale	 Exploitation	 and	 Recovery	 Projection	 and	
Analysis),	to	analyze	the	main	determinants	of	the	profitability	of	shale	wells	and	plays.	
We	 calibrate	our	model	using	production	data	 from	 the	 leading	American	 shale	plays.	
We	 use	 SHERPA	 to	 estimate	 three	 shale	 gas	 production	 scenarios	 exploring	 different	
sets	of	geological	and	technical	hypotheses	for	the	largest	potential	holder	of	shale	gas	
deposits	 in	 Europe,	 France.	 Even	 considering	 that	 the	 geology	 of	 the	 potential	 French	
shale	 deposits	 is	 favorable	 to	 commercial	 extraction,	 we	 find	 that	 under	 assumptions	
calibrated	on	U.S.	production	data,	natural	gas	could	be	produced	at	a	high	breakeven	
price	of	$8.6	per	MMBtu,	and	over	a	45	year	timeframe	have	a	net	present	value	of	$19.6	
billion	–	 less	 than	1%	of	2012	French	GDP.	However,	 the	specificities	of	 the	European	
context,	 notably	 high	 deposit	 depth	 and	 stricter	 environmental	 regulations,	 could	
increase	 drilling	 costs	 and	 further	 decrease	 this	 low	profitability.	We	 find	 that	 a	 40%	
premium	over	American	drilling	 costs	would	make	shale	gas	extraction	uneconomical.	
Absent	 extreme	well	 productivity,	 it	 appears	 very	 difficult	 for	 shale	 gas	 extraction	 to	
have	 an	 impact	 on	 European	 energy	 markets	 comparable	 to	 the	 American	 shale	
revolution.	
1 Introduction	
Over	the	past	decade,	the	rapid	increase	in	oil	and	gas	production	from	shale	deposits	in	the	United	
States	has	profoundly	changed	energy	markets	in	North	America.	In	the	early	2000s,	a	combination	
of	 improved	horizontal	drilling	and	hydraulic	 fracturing	technology	allowed	to	extract	natural	gas	
from	formerly	inaccessible	shale	deposits.	An	environment	of	increasing	gas	prices	in	the	first	half	of	
the	last	decade,	along	with	modifications	to	the	environmental	regulatory	framework	brought	by	the	
Energy	 Policy	 Act	 of	 2005	 (Pub.L.	 109–58,	 2005),	 have	 made	 these	 new	 natural	 gas	 reserves	
commercially	exploitable.	
	
The	 impact	 on	 domestic	 natural	 gas	 production	 in	 the	 United	 States	 was	 large	 and	 swift:	 while	
annual	gross	withdrawals	of	natural	gas	had	been	oscillating	since	the	mid‐1990s	between	23.7	and	
24.5	Tcf	per	year,	they	grew	by	29%	from	2005	to	2013	to	reach	30.2	Tcf	in	2013	(EIA,	2014b).	The	
application	of	the	same	technology	to	tight	oil	deposits	(sometimes	also	referred	to	as	“shale	oil”)	
has	been	arguably	even	more	dramatic.	Breaking	a	long‐term	decline	trend	which	had	seen	a	44%	
decline	 between	 1985	 and	 2008,	 domestic	 U.S.	 crude	 oil	 production	 has	 increased	 by	 55%	 since	
2008	to	reach	7.4	MMbbl/day	in	2013.	
	
The	 rapid	 expansion	 of	 U.S.	 fossil	 fuel	 production	 has	 had	 a	 number	 of	macroeconomic	 impacts,	
notably	 in	 the	 form	of	 increased	activity	 from	intensive	drilling,	 lowered	natural	gas	prices,	and	a	
reduction	 in	 fossil	 fuel	 imports.	 However,	 the	 magnitude	 of	 these	 impacts	 remains	 a	 matter	 of	
controversy.	Some	reports,	notably	IHS	(2011)	and	IHS	(2013),	have	estimated	that	drilling	activity,	
combined	 with	 the	 on	 shoring	 of	 some	 industries	 back	 in	 the	 United	 States	 –	 petrochemical	 in	
particular	–	could	support	up	to	870,000	jobs	by	2015.		
	
These	 conclusions	 are	 challenged	 by	 studies	 such	 as	 EMF	 (2013)	 or	 Spencer,	 Sartor	 &	 Mathieu	
(2014).	 Recognizing	 that	 shale	 well	 drilling	 only	 has	 a	 highly	 localized	 impact	 on	 activity	 and	
employment,	 EMF	 (2013)	 estimates	 that	 shale	 development	would	 only	 boost	 GDP	 by	 “a	modest	
0.46%”,	 and	 downplays	 the	 importance	 of	 shale	 gas	 as	 a	 “game‐changer”	 for	 the	 U.S.	 economy.	
Similarly,	 Spencer,	 Sartor	 &	 Mathieu	 (2014)	 highlight	 that	 the	 small	 share	 of	 energy‐intensive	
industries	 in	 the	 U.S.	 economy	 and	 of	 natural	 gas	 expenditures	 in	 households’	 budgets	 limit	 the	
overall	macroeconomic	impact	that	can	be	expected	from	the	steep	reduction	in	natural	gas	prices.		
	
Still,	 the	existence	of	potentially	 large	shale	deposits	 in	Europe,	notably	 in	France,	Poland	and	the	
United	 Kingdom,	 has	 fostered	 speculation	 on	 whether	 the	 oft‐called	 “shale	 revolution”	 could	 be	
duplicated	 on	 the	 continent.	 This	 issue	 is	 particularly	 relevant	 for	 natural	 gas,	 as	 European	
dependency	 on	 foreign	 exports	 has	 important	 energy	 security	 and	 geopolitical	 ramifications,	
notably	vis‐à‐vis	the	Russian	Federation	(IEA,	2012).		
	
Gény	 (2010)	 examines	 this	 issue	 and	 concludes	 that	 the	 large	 differences	 in	 terms	 of	 onshore	
drilling	 industry	 maturity,	 ease	 of	 access	 to	 land,	 mineral	 ownership	 rights	 and	 environmental	
regulations	make	U.S.	operational	and	business	model	for	shale	gas	development	inapplicable	to	the	
European	 context.	 Absent	 a	 focus	 on	 geological	 “sweet	 spots,	 R&D,	 workforce	 training,	 and	 new	
technology	developments”,	 the	 shale	 revolution	appears	 impossible	 to	 replicate	 in	Europe.	On	the	
same	note,	Spencer	et	al.	(2014)	finds	that	“[i]t	is	unlikely	that	the	EU	will	repeat	the	US	experience	
in	terms	of	the	scale	of	unconventional	oil	and	gas	production”,	and	that	“[s]hale	production	would	
not	have	significant	macroeconomic	or	competitiveness	impacts	for	Europe	in	the	period	to	2030‐
2035”.	
	
These	analyses	are	hampered	by	the	lack	of	data	on	the	geology	of	European	shale	deposits,	on	shale	
gas	 wells	 productivity	 or	 on	 drilling	 costs	 in	 Europe.	 In	 the	 present	 paper,	 we	 propose	 to	
compensate	 for	 this	by	using	historical	production	data	 from	 the	U.S.	 case	 to	calibrate	a	model	of	
shale	gas	production	–	notably	regarding	well	productivity,	drilling	costs	and	operational	costs.	We	
then	adapt	those	assumptions	to	the	European	context	through	an	analysis	of	 its	specificities.	This	
model	can	then	be	used	to	simulate	shale	gas	production	scenarios	in	European	countries.		
	
We	 choose	 to	 focus	 our	 scenarios	 on	 France,	 as	 it	 is	 the	 largest	 potential	 holder	 of	 shale	 gas	
resources	in	continental	Europe.	Besides,	the	ban	on	all	exploration	and	extraction	of	shale	deposits	
passed	in	2011,	then	confirmed	by	the	French	Constitutional	Council	in	20131,	makes	it	a	good	case	
study	of	the	impact	of	the	regulatory	environment	on	shale	development.	
	
The	 paper	 is	 structured	 as	 follows:	 we	 first	 present	 a	 techno‐economic	 model,	 SHERPA	 (SHale	
Exploitation	 and	 Recovery	 Projection	 and	 Analysis),	 to	 analyze	 the	 main	 determinants	 of	 the	
profitability	of	shale	wells	and	plays.	We	then	perform	a	detailed	analysis	of	U.S.	production	data	in	
																																																													
1	“France’s	constitutional	council	upholds	ban	on	fracking”,	Financial	Times,	11	October	2013	
leading	shale	plays,	which	allows	us	to	calibrate	SHERPA.	We	then	examine	the	specificities	of	 the	
European	context	that	have	a	bearing	on	the	technical	and	economic	assumptions	used.	We	finally	
present	 three	 scenarios	 of	 production	 based	 on	 different	 geological	 and	 technical	 hypotheses	 for	
France,	 the	 largest	potential	holder	of	 shale	gas	deposits	 in	Europe;	 estimate	 them	with	SHERPA;	
and	conclude.	
2 Modeling	shale	production	
In	 order	 to	 model	 shale	 production	 scenarios	 in	 Europe	 and	 identify	 the	 main	 parameters	 that	
determine	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 production	 flow	 along	with	 its	 volume,	we	 develop	 a	 techno‐economic	
model	 named	 SHERPA	 (Shale	 Extraction	 and	 Recovery	 Projection	 and	 Analysis).	 This	 section	
presents	the	model	and	specifies	its	equations.	
	
Production	profile	of	a	single	well	
Oil	 and	 gas	 wells	 follow	 a	 well‐identified	 production	 profile	 during	 their	 life	 cycle	 (Arps,	 1944).	
Their	production	 flow	usually	reaches	 its	maximum	early	on,	and	then	decreases	at	a	decline	rate	
that	can	vary	over	the	well’s	lifespan.	
	
This	production	profile	has	been	characterized	by	Arps	(1944).	In	its	most	generic	formulation,	the	
production	of	a	well	can	be	expressed	as	follows:	
	
ݍሺݐሻ ൌ ݍ଴ 1ሺ1 ൅ ܾܦ଴ݐሻ
ଵ
௕
	 (1)
	
where	ݍ଴	is	 the	 initial	 production,	ܦ଴	the	 initial	 decline	 rate,	 and	ܾ	(0 ൑ ܾ ൑ 1)	 a	 parameter	controlling	the	evolution	of	the	decline	rate	over	time.	The	parameter	ܾ	notably	determines	the	type	
of	decline	(see	Figure	1):		
	
 exponential	 (ܾ ൌ 0),	where	production	decreases	over	 time	with	a	constant	decline	rate.	 If	
this	 decline	 rate	 is	 high,	 most	 of	 the	 production	 is	 front‐loaded	 over	 the	 first	 years	 of	
exploitation;		
 hyperbolic	 (0 ൏ ܾ ൏ 1),	where	 the	decline	 rate	decreases	over	 time.	 If	 this	decrease	 is	 fast	
enough,	the	impact	of	high	initial	decline	rates	on	the	well’s	production	can	be	balanced	by	a	
longer	well	lifespan;	
 harmonic	(ܾ ൌ 1),	which	is	a	special	case	of	hyperbolic	decline.	It	is	the	slowest	of	all	three	
types	of	declines,	i.e.	the	one	that	yields	the	largest	late‐life	production	flows.	
	
Figure	1:	Types	of	well	production	decline	(ࢗ૙ ൌ ૚૙૙૙,	ࡰ૙ ൌ ૚૞%)	
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This	equation	highlights	the	two	most	important	parameters	when	estimating	the	expected	output	
of	a	well	over	 its	 entire	 lifespan:	 the	well’s	 initial	production	and	 the	dynamic	of	 the	decline	 rate	
over	the	well’s	life	cycle.	
	
In	this	paper,	we	shall	consider	a	discretized	version	of	the	Arps	equation	to	estimate	the	monthly	
production	of	the	wells	that	will	be	modeled.	Using	a	decline	rate	of	ߜ௡	in	month	݊,	the	production	for	month	݊	can	be	expressed	as:	
	
ݍ௡ ൌ ݍ଴ሺ1 െ ߜ௡ሻ௡ (2)	
The	total	production	over	the	well’s	lifetime,	ܰ௪,	which	amounts	to	its	Estimated	Ultimate	Recovery	(EUR),	becomes:	
	
ܳ௪௘௟௟ ൌ ෍ݍ଴ሺ1 െ ߜ௡ሻ௡
ேೢ
௡ୀ଴
	 (3)
	
If	we	then	suppose	that	drilling	costs	amount	to	ܫ,	the	marginal	cost	per	unit	of	production	amounts	
to	ܿ௠,	and	the	wholesale	price	amounts	to	݌,	the	Net	Present	Value	(NPV)	of	this	production	is,	for	a	discount	rate	of	ݎ:	
	
ܰܲ ௪ܸ௘௟௟ ൌ ෍ݍ଴ሺ݌ െ ܿ௠ሻ
ሺ1 െ ߜ௡ሻ௡
ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ௡
ேೢ
௡ୀ଴
െ ܫ	 (4)
	
The	breakeven	price,	݌∗,	corresponds	to	the	price	for	which	this	NPV	is	zero.	From	equation	(4),	we	
find	݌∗,	which	can	be	split	into	a	marginal	component	and	a	fixed	costs	component	which	amortizes	
the	initial	drilling	costs:	
	
݌∗ ൌ ܿ݉ ൅ ܫ
∑ ݍ0ሺ1 െ ߜ݊ሻ݊ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ݊
ܰݓ݊ൌ0
	 (5)
	
Production	of	a	play	and	production	plateau	
In	 order	 to	 model	 the	 total	 production	 of	 a	 play,	 we	 consider	 the	 production	 profile	 of	 a	
representative	 well.	 Thus,	 we	 capture	 the	 diversity	 observed	 across	 American	 plays	 in	 well	
productivity	 and	 decline	 speed	 solely	 through	 this	 “average”	 well.	 This	 approach	 allows	 us	 to	
analyze	 the	 aggregate	 production	 of	 the	 play	 across	 its	 entire	 lifespan.	 This	 hypothesis	 is	 a	
simplification	since	it	is	well	documented	that	the	productivity	of	shale	wells	vary	greatly,	including	
within	a	single	play	(EIA,	2011).	However,	it	is	expected	that	this	diversity	would	mostly	bear	on	the	
dynamics	of	 the	drilling	effort	–	with	 the	most	productive	spots	being	drilled	 first	once	 identified.	
Characterizing	the	representative	average	is	sufficient	to	estimate	field‐wide	variables	of	interest	to	
the	 present	 study,	 such	 as	 aggregate	 production	 flow,	 expected	 total	 production,	 or	 average	
breakeven	price.	
	
Let	us	consider	a	play	for	which	the	production	of	the	representative	well	is	described	by	equation	
2.	If	ܦ௡	wells	are	drilled	in	month	݊,	then	the	production	of	the	play	in	month	݊,	ܳ௡,	is	expressed	as:		
ܳ௡ ൌ ෍ܦ௜ݍ଴ሺ1 െ ߜ௡ି௜ሻሺ௡ି௜ሻ
௡
௜ୀ଴
	 (6)
	
If	we	call	ܦோ	the	highest	drilling	rate	over	the	production	period	of	 the	play	 ௣ܰ,	and	ߜ	the	smallest	
decline	rate	observed	in	any	given	month	across	the	lifespan	of	the	representative	well:	
	
ܦோ ൌ max଴ஸ௡ஸே೛ ܦ௡
ߜ ൌ min଴ஸ௡ஸேೢ ߜ௡	
(7)
	
Then	we	obtain	the	following	upper	bound	on	the	production	of	the	play:	
	
ܳ௡ ൑ ܦோݍ଴ߜ 	 (8)	
This	 inequality	 illustrates	 an	 important	 phenomenon.	 The	 production	 of	 the	 play	 is	 at	 all	 times	
bounded	by	a	production	plateau,	whose	value	only	depends	on	the	average	initial	production,	the	
lower	 bound	of	 the	decline	 rate	 across	 the	 lifespan	of	 the	 representative	well,	 and	 the	maximum	
drilling	rate.	As	the	drilling	rate	increases	towards	its	maximum	value,	and	as	the	play	matures,	the	
production	 of	 the	 entire	 play	 actually	 converges	 towards	 a	 plateau	which	 is	 strictly	 bounded	 by	
equation	 7,	 with	 the	 speed	 of	 convergence	 depending	 on	 the	 steepness	 of	 the	 decline	 rate.	 This	
plateau	corresponds	to	the	phase	 in	the	play	 life	cycle	when	drilling	new	wells	can	only	offset	the	
declining	production	of	old	wells,	without	increasing	the	aggregate	production	of	the	play.	Yet,	if	the	
average	decline	rate	 is	 low,	 this	plateau	can	be	so	high	as	 to	never	be	bounding	within	 the	play’s	
lifespan.		
	
Indeed,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 conventional	 oil	 and	 gas	 fields,	 the	 observed	 annual	 decline	 rates	 can	 be	
estimated	to	be	around	3	to	4	%	(Höök,	Hirsch,	&	Aleklett,	2009):	in	that	case,	the	production	of	the	
field	remains	below	95	%	of	the	plateau’s	value	during	the	first	75	years	of	extraction.	However,	for	
annual	decline	 rates	 closer	 to	 the	50%	 levels	 observed	on	 shale	deposits	 (see	Table	3),	 the	 same	
threshold	can	be	reached	within	four	years	only.	
	
This	 phenomenon	 of	 production	 plateau,	 where	 new	 wells	 are	 only	 drilled	 to	 maintain	 existing	
production	 volume,	 is	 thus	 characteristic	 of	 shale	 plays.	 Once	 reached,	 breaching	 the	 production	
plateau	 entails	 improving	 well	 productivity	 through	 better	 technology,	 or	 increasing	 the	 drilling	
rate.	Geological	constraints	can	set	hard	limits	on	well	productivity,	although	recent	improvement	in	
drilling	 and	 fracturing	 technology	 have	 achieved	 some	 improvements	 (EIA,	 2014a);	 the	 simplest	
way	to	maintain	production	growth	is	to	sustain	a	continuous	increase	in	the	drilling	rate.	
3 Data	calibration	
	
Calibrating	 the	 equation	describing	 the	production	profile	of	 the	 representative	well	 (equation	2)	
requires	 detailed	 knowledge	 of	 the	 geological	 characteristics	 of	 the	 play	 considered.	 Great	
uncertainties	remain	in	Europe	over	the	actual	volume	of	resources	in	place	and	of	technically	and	
commercially	recoverable	reserves	(IFPEN,	2013).	Besides,	since	only	around	50	experimental	wells	
have	been	drilled	on	the	continent	so	far	(Spencer	et	al.,	2014),	production	data	has	yet	to	be	made	
available	publicly.	
	
It	 is	 therefore	 necessary	 to	 gather	 this	 calibration	 data	 from	 a	 different	 source.	 Ever	 since	 the	
commercial	 extraction	of	 shale	deposits	 began	during	 the	 last	decade,	 close	 to	60	 shale	gas	plays	
have	 been	 drilled	 in	 the	 United	 States	 (Hughes,	 2013).	 30	 out	 of	 these	 60	 plays	 have	 proved	
profitable,	with	only	six	of	those	accounting	for	more	than	90%	of	the	total	natural	gas	production	
from	shale	deposits	 in	 the	United	States	 (EIA,	2013).	Production	data	 from	North	American	plays	
thus	covers	a	wide	variety	of	distinct	geological	configurations.	A	detailed	analysis	of	this	data	can	
provide	a	basis	for	the	calibration	of	our	model.	
	
In	 a	 number	 of	 States,	 home	 to	 some	 of	 North	 America’s	 largest	 shale	 plays,	 production	 reports	
provided	by	operators	are	made	available	publicly.	This	data	provides	a	very	precise	description	of	
the	shale	well	production	profiles.	Using	this	information,	we	can	estimate	realistic	intervals	for	the	
key	parameters	f	equation	2,	initial	production	and	decline	rate.	
	
Initial	production	
We	have	undertaken	this	statistical	analysis	in	two	major	natural	gas‐producing	plays,	Haynesville	
and	 Fayetteville.	 The	 production	 data	 was	 obtained	 from	 the	 Louisiana	 Department	 of	 Natural	
Resources	and	from	the	Arkansas	Oil	and	Gas	Commission.	We	therefore	restrict	our	analysis	to	the	
portion	of	 the	Haynesville	play	 located	 in	Louisiana	 and	 the	Arkansas	 section	of	Fayetteville.	Our	
data	 includes	 initial	 production	 and	 drilling	 date	 for	 2,432	 wells	 in	 Haynesville,	 and	 monthly	
production	and	drilling	date	for	4,882	wells	in	Fayetteville.	
	
We	first	estimate	the	average	initial	production	of	wells	in	each	play,	and	examine	its	evolution	over	
time	by	year	of	drilling.	The	results	are	presented	in	Figure	2	below.	
	
Figure	2:	Well's	initial	production	by	drilling	year	in	the	Haynesville	and	Fayetteville	
Haynesville	(Louisiana)
Source:	Louisiana’s	Department	of	Natural	Resources	/	
Author’s	calculations	
Fayetteville	(Arkansas)
Source:	Arkansas	Oil	and	Gas	Commission	/	
Author’s	calculations	
	
We	find	that	the	evolution	of	 initial	production	exhibits	a	common	pattern	in	both	plays.	 In	a	 first	
period,	 ranging	 from	2006	 to	2009	 in	Haynesville	and	 from	2005	to	2010	 in	Fayetteville,	 average	
initial	productions	gradually	increase	with	drilling	year.	Provided	that	decline	rates	remain	constant	
across	drilling	 years,	 this	 indicates	 an	 improvement	 in	well	 productivity	 over	 time	 in	 each	of	 the	
plays.	 Indeed,	 a	 simultaneous	 increase	 of	 decline	 rates	 over	 time	 could	 cancel	 out	 the	 impact	 of	
improved	initial	productions	over	the	well’s	total	lifecycle	production.	
	
This	 improvement	 can	 be	 driven	 by	 at	 least	 two	 causes:	 an	 improvement	 in	 extraction	 and	
fracturing	technologies,	which	 leads	to	an	 increase	 in	recovery	rates	of	natural	gas	 from	the	shale	
resource	(EIA,	2014);	and	a	better	knowledge	of	the	field’s	geology,	notably	the	identification	of	so‐
called	“sweet	spots”	–	regions	of	the	play	where	well	productivity	tends	to	be	optimal	–	which	once	
found	concentrate	the	drilling	activity,	thereby	increasing	average	well	productivity	in	the	play	(EIA,	
2011).	In	both	cases,	this	first	period	of	increasing	well	productivity	can	be	understood	as	a	learning	
phase,	either	at	the	play	level	–	during	which	operators	increase	their	geological	knowledge	of	the	
shale	 play	 –,	 or	 at	 the	 industry	 level	 –	 whereby	 technologies	 used	 to	 extract	 shale	 deposits	 are	
improved	simultaneously	across	all	plays.	Further	research	will	be	needed	to	distinguish	the	relative	
contributions	of	each	of	these	factors	in	the	observed	overall	increase	in	well	productivity	over	time.	
	
Once	 this	 learning	 phase	 is	 over,	 average	 initial	 production	 reaches	 a	 stable	 level	 that	 has	 been	
roughly	maintained	to	the	present,	although	the	distribution	of	 initial	productions	has	varied	over	
time	 in	 each	 play.	 In	 the	 Louisiana	 section	 of	 Haynesville,	 average	 initial	 production	 stabilizes	
between	11,930	and	12,880	Mcf/day,	while	in	the	Arkansas	section	of	Fayetteville,	 it	 is	comprised	
between	3,000	and	3,348	Mcf/day.	
	
To	complement	the	results	of	this	analysis,	we	extend	our	estimates	with	those	of	Hughes	(2013),	
who	has	conducted	a	similar	study	on	the	largest	shale	plays	in	the	United	States.	His	estimates	for	
the	average	initial	production	of	a	well	in	each	of	these	plays	are	collected	in	Table	1.	
	
Table	1:	Average	initial	production	of	a	well	in	the	six	largest	shale	gas	plays	in	the	U.S.	
	 Haynesville	 Barnett Marcellus Fayetteville Eagle	Ford	 Woodford
Initial	production	
(Mcf/day)	 8,201	 1,619	 1,947	 2,069	 1,920	 2,292	
Source	:	Hughes	(2013)	
	
With	the	exception	of	Haynesville,	the	average	initial	production	of	a	well	 is	remarkably	similar	in	
five	of	the	six	main	American	shale	gas	plays,	between	1,600	and	2,300	Mcf/day.	The	discrepancy	
between	our	estimates	and	Hughes’	(2013)	for	the	Haynesville	and	the	Fayetteville	has	two	causes:	
first,	his	analysis	was	conducted	over	the	whole	play	in	each	case,	while	we	only	had	access	to	the	
portion	of	 the	plays	 located	 in	 States	 that	 release	public	production	data	 from	operators;	 second,	
Hughes’	(2013)	averages	are	calculated	over	every	wells	ever	drilled	in	the	play	–	even	though	our	
analysis	 shows	 that	 there	 has	 been	 a	 significant	 increase	 in	 initial	 productions	 over	 time.	 This	
implies	 that	 estimates	 of	 average	 initial	 production	 made	 over	 the	 whole	 play’s	 lifespan	 are	
necessarily	 lower	 than	 the	 post‐learning	 phase	 plateau	 we	 identified	 in	 our	 analysis,	 since	 they	
include	wells	drilled	while	technological	and	geological	knowledge	was	still	improving.	
	
Decline	rates	
The	 data	 provided	 by	 the	 Arkansas	 Oil	 and	 Gas	 Commission	 for	 the	 Fayetteville	 play	 includes	
monthly	production	reports	by	well.	This	allows	us	to	estimate	average	decline	rates	over	the	entire	
play,	 along	 with	 their	 evolution	 by	 drilling	 year.	 Unfortunately,	 this	 was	 not	 possible	 with	 the	
Haynesville	data,	which	only	provides	initial	production	for	each	well.	
	
Figure	3	shows	the	average	ratio	of	remaining	production	to	initial	production	for	a	Fayetteville	well	
after	 one	 to	 five	 years	 of	 extraction,	 as	 a	 function	 of	 the	 well’s	 drilling	 year.	 The	 decline	 in	
production	over	time	is	very	steep:	after	three	years,	the	production	flow	is	reduced	on	average	to	
28.3%	 of	 its	 initial	 value;	 after	 five	 years,	 the	 remaining	 flow	 is	 15.5%	 of	 initial	 production	 on	
average.		
	
Figure	3:	Average	remaining	production	as	a	percentage	of	initial	production	after	1	to	5	years,	by	drilling	year	
	Source:	Arkansas	Oil	and	Gas	Commission	/	Author’s	calculations	
	
With	the	exception	of	the	first	two	years	for	which	we	have	data	in	the	Fayetteville,	which	concerns	
only	 1%	 of	 the	 sample,	 the	 average	 decrease	 in	 production	 after	 one	 to	 five	 years	 is	 remarkably	
stable	 over	 drilling	 years	 –	 and	 therefore,	 so	 are	 the	 associated	 decline	 rates.	 This	 indicates	 that	
unlike	 initial	 production,	 the	 average	well’s	 production	 profile	 does	 not	 exhibit	 a	 learning	 phase	
after	 which	 observed	 decline	 rates	 would	 be	 reduced.	 It	 is	 therefore	 reasonable	 to	 assume	 that	
average	 decline	 rates	 estimated	 over	 the	whole	 play’s	 lifespan	 are	 applicable	 to	 the	most	 recent	
wells.	 	 Table	2	presents	 our	 estimates	 for	 the	 average	 year‐on‐year	decline	 rates	of	 a	well	 in	 the	
portion	of	the	Fayetteville	play	located	in	Arkansas.	
	
Table	2:	Average	year‐on‐year	decline	rates	of	a	well	in	Fayetteville	(Arkansas)	
	 Decline	in	year	1	 Decline	in	year	2 Decline	in	year	3 Decline	in	year	4	 Decline	in	year	5
Fayetteville	 57%	 34%	 24%	 21%	 9%	
Source:	Arkansas	Oil	and	Gas	Commission	/	Author’s	calculations	
	
To	get	decline	rates	estimates	for	other	U.S.	shale	gas	plays,	we	complement	our	analysis	with	that	of	
Hughes	 (2013).	His	 estimates	 for	 the	 average	 year‐on‐year	 decline	 rates	 of	 a	well	 in	Haynesville,	
Barnett	and	Marcellus	are	presented	in	Table	3Table	1.	
	
Table	3:	Average	year‐on‐year	decline	rates	of	a	well	in	the	three	main	shale	gas	plays	in	the	U.S.	
	 Haynesville	 Barnett	 Marcellus	
Decline	in	year	1	 68%	 61%	 47%	
Decline	in	year	2	 49%	 32%	 66%	
Decline	in	year	3	 50%	 24%	 71%	
Decline	in	year	4	 48%	 18%	 47%	
Decline	in	year	5	 	 15%	 	
Source	:	Hughes	(2013)	
	
First,	Table	2	 and	Table	3	 illustrate	 the	 large	diversity	of	decline	 rates	observed	across	 shale	 gas	
plays.	 Second,	 we	 find	 that	 in	 general,	 the	 production	 decline	 cannot	 be	 described	 as	 either	
exponential,	 since	 the	 annual	 decline	 rate	 varies	 over	 the	 well’s	 lifespan,	 nor	 hyperbolic,	 since	
decline	 rates	do	not	decrease	monotonically	over	 time.	 	We	 therefore	 calibrate	equation	2	with	a	
monthly	decline	rate	that	varies	for	each	year	of	production.	Beyond	year	5,	annual	decline	rates	are	
assumed	constant.		
	
The	 production	 profile	 of	 the	 representative	well	 is	 tied	 to	 the	 specific	 shale	 play	 considered,	 in	
particular	to	its	geological	characteristics.	Still,	in	keeping	with	our	approach	of	using	historical	U.S.	
production	 data	 to	 calibrate	 SHERPA,	 we	 use	 a	 weighted	 average	 of	 the	 decline	 rates	 estimated	
above,	 using	 the	 2012	 annual	 production	 of	 each	 shale	 play	 examined	 as	weight.	 The	 results	 are	
presented	in	Table	4.	
	
Table	4:	Decline	rates	used	in	the	SHERPA	model	
Decline	in	year	1 Decline	in	year2 Decline	in	year3 Decline	in	year4 Decline	in	year	5	
59%	 46%	 44%	 36%	 13%	
4 Specificities	of	the	European	context	
	
Gas	price	formation	
The	 large	 drop	 in	 natural	 gas	 prices	 over	 the	 past	 decade,	 from	 a	 weekly	 average	 high	 of	
14.49	$/MMBtu	in	December	2005	to	a	low	of	1.86	$/MMBtu	in	April	20122	(see	Figure	4),	has	been	
one	of	 the	more	 significant	 consequences	of	 the	 large	 increase	 in	domestic	 gas	 production	 in	 the	
United	States.		
	
Unlike	 other	 energy	 commodities,	 crude	 oil	 in	 particular,	 the	 market	 for	 natural	 gas	 is	 still	
fragmented	 into	 several	 regional	 markets.	 The	 price	 of	 natural	 gas	 is	 therefore	 different	 in	 the	
United	 States,	 Europe	 and	 East	 Asia	 (IEA,	 2012).	 Hence,	 the	 decrease	 in	 gas	 prices	 illustrated	 in	
Figure	4	has	remained	localized	in	the	United	States.	
	
This	is	due	in	large	part	to	the	difficulty	of	transporting	natural	gas.	Across	oceans,	where	pipelines	
cannot	be	used,	natural	gas	must	be	liquefied	and	transported	in	LNG	tankers.	This	entails	building	
very	expensive	processing	facilities	to	liquefy	the	gas	on	departure,	and	gasify	it	back	on	arrival.	In	
addition,	 processing	 plants	 used	 for	 liquefaction	 cannot	 be	 used	 for	 gasification	 without	 costly	
retrofitting	(IGU,	2012).	
	
	
																																																													
2	Henry	Hub	Natural	Gas	Spot	Price,	weekly	averages.	Source:	U.S.	EIA	
Figure	4:	Henry	Hub	natural	gas	weekly	average	price	(1997‐2013)	
	Source:	U.S.	EIA	
	
Besides,	 gas	price	 formation	mechanisms	are	distinct	 in	each	of	 the	major	markets.	 In	 the	United	
States,	 the	price	of	natural	gas	 is	 set	 through	gas‐on‐gas	competition.	Natural	gas	 is	 traded	over	a	
variety	of	time	frames	(e.g.	daily,	monthly	or	annually)	at	a	number	of	physical	hubs	–	Texas’s	Henry	
Hub	 being	 the	 largest	 –,	 and	 the	 interplay	 of	 supply	 and	demand	determines	 the	price.	 In	 such	 a	
market,	changes	 in	 the	balance	between	supply	and	demand	have	an	 immediate	 impact	on	prices.	
The	United	States,	which	until	the	late	2000s	expected	domestic	natural	gas	production	to	decline,	
had	 built	 LNG	 plants	 to	 import	 gas,	 but	 not	 to	 export	 it	 (EIA,	 2011).	When	 shale	 gas	 extraction	
rapidly	grew,	the	newfound	domestic	production	of	natural	gas	changed	the	local	balance	of	supply	
and	 demand	 immediately.	 From	 2008	 to	 2012,	 domestic	 production	 grew	 at	 a	 rate	 of	 3.6%	 per	
annum,	outpacing	consumption,	which	only	grew	at	2.3%	per	annum3:	this	led	to	the	large	drop	in	
prices.	
	
In	Europe,	gas	price	 formation	 follows	a	different	mechanism.	Traditionally,	European	natural	gas	
supplies	have	been	priced	through	a	mix	of	long‐term	contracts	with	producing	countries	and	spot	
market	 pricing.	 Long‐term	 contracts	 are	 mostly	 priced	 using	 a	 mechanism	 known	 as	 oil	 price	
escalation,	whereby	gas	prices	are	linked,	usually	through	a	base	price	and	an	escalation	clause,	to	
the	price	of	competing	fuels	–	typically	crude	oil	(IGU,	2012).	Oil	price	escalation	used	to	dominate	
natural	gas	price	formation	in	Europe.	However,	since	the	late	2000s,	oil	 indexation	of	natural	gas	
contracts	has	been	decreasing:	as	of	2012,	51%	of	European	gas	consumption	was	priced	through	
an	oil	price	escalation	clause,	down	from	59%	in	2010.	Meanwhile,	from	2007	to	2012,	spot‐priced	
natural	gas	volumes	have	doubled,	to	reach	44%	of	consumption	(EC,	2013).	
	
This	pricing	structure	makes	European	wholesale	gas	prices	less	elastic	to	changes	in	the	balance	of	
supply	and	demand.	While	an	increase	in	domestic	production	could	improve	the	bargaining	power	
of	 European	 countries	with	 their	 suppliers,	 the	 impact	 of	 introducing	 small	 volumes	 of	 domestic	
shale	gas	production	in	the	European	supply	mix	on	gas	prices	is	unclear.	
	
We	therefore	choose	to	estimate	the	profitability	of	shale	gas	extraction	at	a	given	wholesale	price.	
For	 our	 main	 scenarios,	 we	 use	 the	 Russian	 Natural	 Gas	 border	 price	 in	 Germany,	 which	 is	 a	
common	benchmark	for	gas	prices	in	continental	Europe,	averaged	over	the	period	2011‐2013.	We	
obtain	 a	 wholesale	 price	 hypothesis	 of	 $11.6/MMBtu.	 We	 then	 explore	 the	 sensitivity	 to	 that	
hypothesis	in	several	variants.	
	
																																																													
3	Source:	U.S.	EIA	Natural	Gas	statistics	
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Drilling	costs	
Public	data	on	drilling	costs	is	scarce,	which	makes	their	calibration	difficult.	According	to	the	U.S.	
EIA,	 drilling	 costs	 per	 well	 in	 the	 leading	 shale	 plays	 of	 Marcellus,	 Bakken	 and	 Eagle	 Ford	 are	
comprised	between	$6.5	and	$9	million,	including	both	horizontal	drilling	and	hydraulic	fracturing	
(EIA,	2012).		
	
However,	these	estimates	cannot	be	used	directly	in	the	European	context.	Notably,	one	of	the	main	
drivers	of	drilling	costs	is	the	depth	of	the	well	and	the	length	of	its	lateral	(Pulsipher,	2007).	Table	5	
presents	average	drilling	costs	and	average	depth	in	the	main	U.S.	shale	plays.	
	
Table	5:	Average	drilling	costs	and	depth	of	the	main	U.S.	shale	plays	
	 Haynesville	 Barnett	 Marcellus	 Fayetteville	 Woodford	 Granite	Wash	
Average	drilling	
costs	(million	USD)	 9.5	 3.5	 5.3	 2.8	 8.5	 7.8	
Average	depth	
(ft)	 12,100	 7,900	 6,200	 3,600	 13,100	 13,100	
Source	:	Nickelson	(2013),	Berman	et	Pittinger	(2011)	
	
As	shown	in	the	above	table,	drilling	costs	increase	with	average	deposit	depth:	the	most	expensive	
wells	 are	 located	 in	 the	 deepest	 shale	 deposits,	 between	 12,000	 and	 13,000	 ft	 on	 average.	 Most	
European	 deposits	 have	 been	 identified	 in	 geological	 strata	 located	 at	 comparable	 depth	:	 the	
majority	 of	 the	French	 resources	would	be	 found	between	10,000	and	14,000	 ft,	 between	10,000	
and	12,500	ft	in	Poland,	between	11,500	and	14,500	ft	in	Germany,	between	11,000	and	12,500	ft	in	
the	Netherlands,	 and	around	11,000	 ft	 in	 Spain;	only	British	 shale	deposits	would	be	 located	at	a	
shallower	depth	of	8,000	ft	(EIA,	2013).	
	
These	elements	lead	us	to	estimate	that	drilling	costs	will	on	average	be	higher	in	Europe	than	in	the	
United	States.	This	is	indeed	the	conclusion	of	Wood	Mackenzie	(2012)	on	the	economic	potential	of	
shale	gas	resources	in	the	United	Kingdom,	which	estimated	that	should	the	British	shale	resources	
be	developed,	the	average	drilling	costs	would	reach	$17	million.	This	would	amount	to	more	than	
one	and	a	half	times	the	average	well	cost	in	the	Haynesville,	where	drilling	costs	are	the	highest	of	
any	American	play.	Oil	services	company	Schlumberger	also	estimated	in	2011	that	drilling	costs	in	
Poland	could	turn	out	to	be	three	times	higher	than	in	the	United	States4.	
	
Finally,	 it	 should	be	noted	 that	 the	availability	of	drilling	equipment	 is	much	higher	 in	 the	United	
States	than	in	Europe.	In	the	first	quarter	of	2014,	more	than	1,700	drilling	rigs	were	being	operated	
in	 the	 United	 States,	 including	 both	 oil	 and	 gas	 plays	 of	 the	 conventional	 and	 unconventional	
varieties	 (EIA,	 2014).	 This	 is	 to	 be	 contrasted	with	 less	 than	 a	 hundred	 rigs	 available	 across	 the	
entire	European	continent	in	2013	(Hsieh,	2011).	Further,	only	a	small	fraction	of	these	rigs	can	be	
used	to	drill	shale	gas	wells:	for	example,	in	2011,	out	of	15	drilling	rigs	available	in	Poland,	only	5	
were	 suitable	 to	 shale	 gas	 extraction.	 These	 capacity	 constraints	 could	 limit	 the	 drilling	 rate	 in	
European	countries,	at	least	in	the	first	years	of	production.	
	
Regulatory	environment	
In	addition	to	the	improvements	made	to	hydraulic	fracturing	and	horizontal	drilling	technologies,	
the	 expansion	 of	 commercial	 shale	 gas	 extraction	 was	 also	 enabled	 by	 changes	 made	 to	 the	
																																																													
4	“Shale‐Gas	Drilling	Cost	in	Poland	Triple	U.S.,	Schlumberger	Says”,	Bloomberg,	29	November	2011	
regulatory	 framework	 governing	 oil	 and	 gas	 production	 –	 especially	 regarding	 environmental	
regulations.	
	
Indeed,	the	Energy	Policy	Act	of	2005	(Pub.L.	109–58,	2005)	brought	some	significant	modifications	
to	the	environmental	legislations	regulating	oil	and	gas	drilling	in	the	United	States.	Passed	at	a	time	
when	conventional	gas	plays	were	exhibiting	signs	of	depletion	(EIA,	2005),	the	Energy	Policy	Act	
defined	 new	 core	 principles	 for	 American	 energy	 policy,	with	 a	 particular	 emphasis	 on	 reducing	
future	dependency	on	fossil	fuel	imports.	The	Act	included	a	number	of	measures	aiming	to	increase	
domestic	 fossil	 fuel	 production.	 Notably,	 two	 existing	 environmental	 laws	 were	 amended	 to	
facilitate	the	use	of	hydraulic	fracturing	–	and	thus	the	extraction	of	oil	and	gas	from	shale	deposits:		
	
 the	 Safe	 Drinking	Water	 Act	 (Pub.	 L.	 93‐523,	 1974),	 which	 regulates	 the	 public	 drinking	
water	supply,	and	ensures	its	quality	and	suitability	for	human	consumption.	Originally,	this	
Act	banned	any	drilling	in	the	vicinity	of	underground	water	reservoirs.	Section	322	of	the	
Energy	Policy	Act	of	2005	lifts	this	ban	for	oil	and	gas	drilling.	
	
 the	Clean	Water	Act	(Pub.	L.	92‐500,	1972),	which	governs	water	pollution.	This	Act	notably	
defines	what	 constitutes	 a	water	 pollutant.	 Through	 an	 amendment	 to	 section	 502	 of	 the	
Clean	Water	Act,	the	Energy	Policy	Act	of	2005	excludes	from	this	definition	“water,	gas,	or	
other	material	which	is	injected	into	a	well	to	facilitate	production	of	oil	or	gas”.	
	
These	changes,	made	to	two	pillars	of	the	environmental	regulatory	framework	of	the	United	States,	
were	essential	to	enable	the	widespread	use	of	hydraulic	fracturing,	and	thus	the	shale	revolution.	
The	former	ban	on	drilling	close	to	water	reservoirs	would	have	prevented	a	number	of	commercial	
wells	from	ever	being	drilled.	Similarly,	without	the	chemical	additives	that	were	formerly	listed	as	
pollutants	 by	 the	 Clean	 Water	 Act,	 hydraulic	 fracturing	 would	 be	 much	 less	 effective,	 and	 well	
productivity	would	be	significantly	lower.	
	
Environmental	regulations	in	Europe	are	much	stricter.	In	particular,	the	use	of	chemical	additives	
in	the	fracturing	fluid,	the	transportation	and	storage	of	flowback	mud	from	well	fracturing,	or	the	
drilling	of	wells	within	proximity	to	water	reservoirs	or	inhabitations	would	all	be	very	difficult	or	
outright	 forbidden	 under	 the	 current	 European	 environmental	 legislation,	 both	 at	 the	 Union	 and	
Member	 State	 level	 (Gény,	 2010).	 Other	 measures	 targeting	 both	 safety	 and	 environmental	
protection,	such	as	standards	of	safety	valves	and	the	compulsoriness	of	multiple	casings	around	the	
well’s	body,	would	have	a	direct	impact	on	drilling	costs.	
	
At	this	stage,	it	is	impossible	to	know	whether	the	European	Union	or	some	of	its	Member	States	will	
amend	 their	 existing	 legislations	 to	 lift	 some	 of	 the	 restrictions	 currently	 limiting	 the	 use	 of	
hydraulic	fracturing.	Fostering	shale	gas	production	on	their	territory	would	entail	rescinding	part	
of	 their	 environmental	 protection	 framework	 to	 favor	 domestic	 on	 shore	 drilling,	 as	 the	 Energy	
Policy	Act	did	 in	 the	United	States	 in	2005.	Currently,	compliance	with	 the	 local	 legislation	would	
lead	to	significantly	higher	drilling	costs	in	Europe	than	in	the	United	States	(Gény,	2010).	
5 Production	scenarios	for	France	
	
Scenarios	
Based	 on	 the	 calibration	 obtained	 from	 the	 statistical	 analysis	 of	 U.S.	 production	 data,	we	 design	
production	 scenarios	 for	 France,	 which	 is	 the	 largest	 potential	 holder	 of	 shale	 gas	 deposits	 in	
Europe.	 We	 focus	 our	 analysis	 on	 natural	 gas	 as	 according	 to	 EIA	 (2013),	 estimated	 technically	
recoverable	 resources	 of	 shale	 gas	 dwarf	 those	 of	 shale	 and	 tight	 oil	 in	 Europe.	 To	 simplify	 the	
analysis,	we	 consider	 the	 two	potential	 shale	 fields	 in	 France,	 the	Paris	 basin	 and	 the	 South‐East	
basin,	as	one	single	field,	on	which	we	formulate	aggregate	hypotheses.		
	
Further,	 our	 price	 hypotheses	 are	 based	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 dry	 gas	 will	 be	 produced	 and	
marketed.	 We	 do	 consider	 the	 possibility	 of	 more	 valuable	 associated	 liquids	 such	 as	 ethane	 or	
butane	being	produced	in	a	variant	of	the	first	scenario	though.	
	
We	consider	three	main	scenarios:	
	
 The	 «	Central	»	 scenario	 aims	 to	 estimate	what	 a	 realistic	 production	 scenario	would	 be,	
should	the	geology	of	the	French	shale	deposits	prove	favorable	to	commercial	extraction.		
Based	on	this	hypothesis,	we	assume	that	well	productivity	would	be	comparable	to	that	of	
the	 main	 U.S.	 commercial	 shale	 gas	 plays:	 we	 therefore	 assume	 an	 average	 initial	
productivity	of	2,200	Mcf/day,	at	the	upper	end	of	the	range	identified	in	Table	1.		
In	our	analysis	of	drilling	costs,	we	observed	 that	French	shale	deposits	were	 located	at	a	
depth	comparable	to	that	of	the	Haynesville	play,	and	that	drilling	costs	were	proportional	to	
the	 deposit	 depth.	 We	 therefore	 assume	 average	 drilling	 costs	 of	 $10	 million.	 This	 last	
hypothesis	 is	 conservative,	 as	 we	 consider	 that	 the	 European	 context	 –	 environmental	
regulations	 in	particular	–	would	only	impose	a	half‐million	dollar	premium	(5%)	per	well	
on	average	in	addition	to	the	$9.5	million	drilling	cost	average	observed	in	the	Haynesville.	
	
 The	«	Zero	NPV	»	scenario	aims	at	determining,	ceteris	paribus,	what	premium	on	average	
drilling	costs	would	cancel	out	the	profitability	of	shale	gas	extraction	in	France.		
We	 therefore	maintain	 the	well	 productivity	 assumption	 of	 the	 Central	 scenario,	 and	 find	
that	adding	a	40%	premium	on	drilling	costs	over	those	observed	in	Haynesville	leads	to	an	
NPV	over	the	entire	duration	of	the	scenario	of	zero.	
	
 The	«	Extreme	»	scenario	performs	a	sensitivity	analysis	on	well	productivity.	
We	conserve	the	drilling	costs	assumption	of	 the	Central	scenario,	but	associate	 it	with	an	
average	well	productivity	comparable	to	that	of	the	best	play	in	the	U.S.,	Haynesville,	with	an	
initial	production	of	8,000	Mcf/day.	This	hypothesis	lies	at	an	extreme	end	of	the	probability	
space,	as	it	amounts	to	considering	that	both	French	shale	gas	fields	would	have	an	average	
well	productivity	comparable	to	that	of	the	very	best	play	known	to	date.	
	
Further,	in	all	scenarios,	we	consider	a	drilling	rate	of	30	wells	per	month,	which	amounts	to	more	
than	10,000	wells	drilled	over	a	period	of	30	years.	
	
Assumptions	for	these	three	scenarios	are	gathered	in	Table	6.	
	
Table	6:	Production	scenarios	assumptions	
Scenario	 Initial	production	(Mcf/day)	
Drilling	cost		
(millions	USD)	
Drilling	rate		
(wells/months)	
1)	Central	 2,200	 10,0	 30	
2)	Zero	NPV	 2,200	 13,3	 30	
3)	Extreme	 8,000	 10,0	 30	
	
In	additions	to	these	differentiating	hypotheses,	we	also	make	the	following	assumptions	across	all	
scenarios:	
	
 the	drilling	period	lasts	for	30	years;	
 the	 drilling	 rate	 is	 increased	 progressively	 during	 the	 first	 three	 years	 of	 the	 scenario,	 in	
order	to	account	for	the	learning	phase	of	the	industry;	
 operational	costs,	estimated	by	Moniz,	 Jacoby	&	Meggs	(2011)	between	$0.5	et	$1	per	Mcf,	
are	pegged	at	$0.75	per	Mcf;	and	
 technically	recoverable	resources	(TRR)	are	estimated	at	137	Tcf	(EIA,	2013).	
	
Finally,	we	assume	 that	 shale	 gas	extraction	will	 be	managed	by	a	 state‐owned	company.	 Indeed,	
calls	 have	been	made	–	 notably	by	 the	French	 Industry	Minister	 –	 for	 shale	 gas	production	 to	be	
carried	out	by	a	public	body,	should	the	ban	on	shale	gas	exploration	and	extraction	be	lifted5.	This	
leads	us	to	use	a	discount	rate	of	4%	in	the	calculation	of	net	present	values,	as	 it	 is	 the	standard	
rate	 used	 by	 the	 French	 Treasury	 to	 evaluate	 the	 profitability	 of	 government‐sponsored	 projects	
(DG	Trésor,	2005).	
	
Results	
We	use	the	SHERPA	model	to	estimate	the	average	breakeven	price	and	estimated	ultimate	recovery	
(EUR)	per	well,	the	share	of	technically	recoverable	resources	extracted,	and	the	net	present	value	
of	the	natural	gas	produced.	Results	are	presented	in	Table	7.	
	
Table	7:	Main	scenario	results	
Scenario	
Breakeven		
price	
(USD/MMBtu)	
EUR	
	(bcf)	
Peak	
production	
(bcf/year)	
Share	of	TRR	
produced	
NPV	
	(billion	USD)	
1)	Central	 	8.6	 	1.4	 491	 10%	 	19.6	
2)	Zero	NPV	 	11.2	 	1.4	 491	 10%	 	0	
3)	Extreme		 	2.8	 	5.0	 1,787	 37%	 	228	
Source	:	SHERPA	model	
	
The	assumptions	of	 the	Central	scenario	bring	the	breakeven	price	of	natural	gas	close	to	our	gas	
price	hypothesis.	Therefore,	 the	NPV	of	natural	 gas	 extracted	over	 the	 entire	 scenario	duration	 is	
fairly	low,	at	$19.6	billion	–	which	represents	less	than	1%	of	2012	French	GDP.	At	peak,	domestic	
natural	gas	production	would	cover	31%	of	France’s	2012	consumption	of	1,560	bcf.	
	
The	second	scenario	illustrates	the	sensitivity	of	breakeven	price	to	the	average	drilling	cost.	Under	
our	gas	price	hypothesis,	an	increase	of	33%	in	drilling	costs	over	the	Central	scenario	is	enough	to	
bring	the	breakeven	price	on	par	with	our	wholesale	price	assumption:	the	NPV	is	thus	brought	to	
naught.	Similarly,	a	reduction	in	average	well	productivity	–	for	example	due	to	adverse	geological	
conditions	–,	while	maintaining	constant	drilling	costs,	would	have	quickly	reduced	the	NPV	to	zero.	
	
Finally,	 the	 third	 scenario	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 well	 productivity	 in	 determining	 the	
breakeven	 price,	 and	 therefore	 the	 profitability	 of	 natural	 gas	 extraction.	 Unsurprisingly,	 should	
French	shale	gas	plays	exhibit	the	same	well	productivity	as	the	best	American	play	known	to	date,	
the	NPV	of	the	gas	produced	would	amount	to	several	percentage	points	of	French	GDP.	Under	these	
																																																													
5	“France	plans	to	invest	in	state	mining	venture”,	Financial	Times,	21	February	2014	
extreme	well	productivity	assumptions,	France	could	even	become	a	net	natural	gas	exporter,	as	the	
peak	annual	domestic	production	is	200	bcf	higher	than	the	2012	consumption.	
	
The	 production	 profile	 and	 cash	 flow	 of	 the	 Central	 scenario	 are	 presented	 in	 Figure	 5.	 For	
reference,	the	same	charts	are	provided	for	all	scenarios	in	the	annex.	
	
Figure	5:	Central	scenario	results	
Annual	natural	gas	production	 Cash	flow	
Source:	SHERPA	model	
	
The	 aggregate	 natural	 gas	 production	 increases	 over	 the	 first	 15	 years	 of	 the	 scenario,	 before	
reaching	a	plateau	until	year	30.	This	 illustrates	 the	phenomenon	of	production	plateau	described	
previously,	 and	 is	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	past	 the	 first	 3	 years	 of	 ramp‐up,	 the	drilling	 rate	 remains	
constant	 throughout	the	drilling	phase,	at	30	wells	per	month.	Since	well	productivity	hypotheses	
are	assumed	to	hold	over	the	whole	scenario’s	timeframe,	production	cannot	increase	beyond	that	
plateau	without	an	increase	in	the	drilling	rate.	As	soon	as	the	drilling	ceases	in	year	31,	aggregate	
production	undergoes	a	steep	reduction,	at	an	 initial	rate	of	25%	to	30%	a	year,	then	softening	to	
around	20%	after	the	first	5	years	of	terminal	decline.	
	
The	 large	upfront	drilling	costs	 lead	 to	negative	cash	 flows	 for	 the	 first	 five	years	of	 the	scenario.	
This	negative	runway	increases	for	the	first	3	years	of	the	scenario	as	the	drilling	rate	is	ramped	up	
to	 30	wells	 per	month.	 The	 positive	 spike	 in	 cash‐flow	 in	 year	 31	 corresponds	 to	 the	 end	 of	 the	
drilling	phase:	wells	that	were	drilled	 in	earlier	periods	keep	producing	 for	15	years,	per	 the	well	
life	expectancy	hypothesis,	with	no	further	expense	but	the	$0.75/Mcf	operational	expense.	
	
We	then	perform	three	sensitivity	analyses	on	the	Central	scenario.	We	first	consider	the	possibility	
that	French	deposits	produce	“wet”	gas,	i.e.	both	methane	and	associated	natural	gas	liquids	(NGLs)	
such	as	ethane	or	butane.	We	model	this	variant	as	a	10%	increase	in	the	wholesale	price	of	natural	
gas	over	our	hypothesis	of	$11.6/MMBtu,	since	on	a	per‐Btu	basis,	NGLs	command	a	higher	price	
than	natural	gas	on	European	markets6.	One	should	note	that	the	expansion	of	wet	gas	in	the	United	
States	has	actually	brought	down	the	price	of	some	liquids.	For	example,	the	profitability	of	ethane	is	
now	 on‐par	 with	 natural	 gas	 on	 a	 per‐Btu	 basis:	 the	 increased	 profitability	 of	 wet	 gas	 could	
therefore	be	transitory7.	
	
																																																													
6	Source:	OPIS	
7	“Changes	in	Longitudes	–	Ethane	Exports	to	Europe”,	RBN	Energy,	24	March	2014	
Next,	 we	 evaluate	 a	 Central	 scenario	 where	 the	 production	 would	 be	 undertaken	 by	 a	 private	
company	instead	of	a	state‐owned	structure.	In	this	variant,	we	thus	consider	a	discount	rate	of	10%	
instead	of	the	4%	used	in	the	standard	Central	scenario.	This	allows	us	to	estimate	the	sensitivity	of	
the	breakeven	price	and	the	NPV	to	the	discount	rate.		
	
Finally,	we	consider	a	variant	of	the	Central	scenario	where	natural	gas	prices	do	not	remain	stable,	
but	 instead	 halve	 over	 the	 duration	 of	 the	 scenario.	 This	 could	 occur	 if,	 for	 example,	 several	
European	countries	had	shale	gas	deposits	with	favorable	geology,	and	decided	to	start	extracting	
their	natural	gas	simultaneously.	Their	combined	newfound	domestic	productions	could	lead	to	an	
oversupply	of	natural	gas	on	the	European	market,	or,	equivalently,	increase	their	bargaining	power	
with	foreign	suppliers	to	renegotiate	long‐term	contracts	and	lower	natural	gas	prices	in	Europe.	
	
Table	8:	Central	scenario	variants	
	 Assumptions	 Results	
Variant	 Wholesale	price	(USD/MMBtu)	 Discount	rate	
Breakeven		price
(USD/MMBtu)	
NPV	
	(billion	USD)	
1a)	Wet	gas	 	12.7	 	4%	 8.6	 	28	
1b)	Private	 	11.6	 	10%	 9.5	 	5.5	
1c)	Decreasing			
gas	price		 	11.6	 	4%	 8.6	 	4.9	
Source	:	SHERPA	model	
	
We	find	that	an	increase	in	wholesale	gas	prices	of	10%	over	our	main	hypothesis	of	$11.6/MMBtu	
would	 increase	 the	NPV	by	43%,	at	$28	billion.	 	This	highlights	 the	high	sensitivity	of	 the	overall	
profitability	 of	 shale	 gas	 extraction	 to	 the	 wholesale	 gas	 price.	 Conversely,	 should	 gas	 prices	
decrease	by	half	over	 the	production	period,	 the	NPV	would	be	reduced	by	75%.	As	 illustrated	 in	
Figure	6,	in	variant	1c,	shale	gas	extraction	even	becomes	briefly	cash‐flow	negative	at	the	end	of	the	
drilling	period.	
	
Figure	6:	Cash	flow	for	variant	1c	–	Decreasing	gas	price	
		
Finally,	 increasing	 the	 discount	 rate	 to	 10%	 also	 reduces	 the	 profitability	 of	 shale	 gas	 extraction	
sharply:	 the	NPV	 is	 reduced	by	72%	compared	with	 a	4%	discount	 rate,	 and	 the	breakeven	price	
increases	by	10%	to	$9.5/MMBtu.	Thus,	under	our	Central	hypotheses,	 commercial	production	of	
shale	gas	by	a	private	entity	in	France	appears	difficult.	
6 Conclusion	
To	 assess	 whether	 the	 American	 shale	 gas	 revolution	 can	 be	 duplicated	 in	 Europe,	 we	 have	
determined	the	main	drivers	of	shale	gas	extraction	profitability.	To	this	end,	we	have	presented	a	
techno‐economic	model	of	shale	gas	production,	SHERPA,	which	allowed	us	to	identify	the	following	
key	parameters:	well	productivity,	as	described	by	initial	production	and	decline	rates,	and	drilling	
costs.	
	
The	 volume	 and	 geological	 characteristics	 of	 shale	 gas	 resources	 in	 Europe	 remain	 speculative.	
Besides,	experimental	drilling	has	remained	very	scarce.	 It	 is	 therefore	not	possible	to	assess	well	
productivity	 in	 the	 potential	 European	 shale	 gas	 plays.	At	 this	 stage,	we	 cannot	 directly	 calibrate	
SHERPA	on	European	production	data.	
	
To	remedy	this	lack	of	data,	we	perform	a	detailed	statistical	analysis	of	existing	production	data	in	
the	leading	U.S.	shale	plays	to	calibrate	realistic	ranges	for	initial	productions	and	decline	rates.	We	
then	 analyze	 the	 specificities	 of	 the	 European	 context,	 notably	 in	 terms	 of	 gas	 price	 formation,	
drilling	costs	and	environmental	regulations,	to	define	hypotheses	reflecting	these	particularities.	
	
Using	 SHERPA,	 we	 then	 estimate	 production	 scenarios	 for	 France,	 which	 is	 the	 largest	 potential	
holder	of	shale	gas	resources	in	Europe.	All	scenarios	start	from	the	premise	that	the	geology	of	the	
French	deposits	proves	conducive	to	the	commercial	extraction	of	shale	gas.		
	
However,	even	under	that	hypothesis,	assuming	well	productivity	comparable	to	that	of	five	of	the	
six	largest	U.S.	shale	plays,	and	conservative	drilling	costs	of	$10	million	per	well,	we	find	that	the	
breakeven	price	of	shale	gas	extraction	would	be	high	and	 the	profitability	 relatively	 low.	 Indeed,	
only	 under	 extreme	 well	 productivity	 hypotheses	 does	 the	 profitability	 of	 shale	 gas	 become	
significant.	
	
Conversely,	we	find	that	increased	drilling	costs	40%	above	their	American	counterparts,	a	discount	
rate	of	10%	compatible	with	production	by	a	private	entity,	or	a	progressive	halving	of	wholesale	
gas	prices	over	45	years	would	all	make	shale	gas	extraction	close	 to	or	entirely	uneconomical	 in	
France.	
	
Thus,	it	appears	that	even	if	the	geology	of	European	shale	deposits	was	favorable,	an	expansion	of	
shale	gas	production	on	a	scale	comparable	to	the	American	experience	over	the	past	decade	cannot	
be	reproduced	in	Europe	at	present.	Only	under	the	most	favorable	geological	configurations	could	
shale	gas	extraction	prove	highly	profitable	in	Europe.		
	
Absent	extreme	well	productivity,	or	a	technological	improvement	that	would	lower	drilling	costs	or	
increase	 recovery	 rates	 while	 complying	 with	 local	 environmental	 regulations,	 it	 appears	 very	
difficult	for	shale	gas	extraction	to	have	a	significant	impact	on	European	energy	markets.	
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Annex	
Figure	7:	Central	scenario	results	
Annual	natural	gas	production	 Cash	flow	
Figure	8:	Zero	NPV	scenario	results	
Annual	natural	gas	production	 Cash	flow	
Figure	9:	Extreme	scenario	results	
Annual	natural	gas	production	 Cash	flow	
Figure	10:	Central	scenario,	Wet	gas	variant	results	
Annual	natural	gas	production	 Cash	flow	
Figure	11:	Central	scenario,	Private	variant	results	
Annual	natural	gas	production	 Cash	flow	
Figure	12:	Central	scenario,	Decreasing	gas	price	results	
Annual	natural	gas	production	 Cash	flow	
 
